Abstract. The Shapley-Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which each player is pivotal. The Banzhaf power index depends on the number of ways in which each voter can e¤ect a swing. We introduce a combinatorial method based in generating functions for computing these power indices e¢ciently and we study the time complexity of the algorithms. We also analyze the meet of two weighted voting games. Finally, we compute the voting power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union with the generating functions algorithms and we present its implementation in the system Mathematica. Mathematics Subject Classi…cation 2000: 91A12.
1. Introduction. The analysis of power is central in political science. In general, it is di¢cult to de…ne the idea of power, but for the special case of voting power there are mathematical power indices that have been used. The …rst such power index was proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954) who apply the Shapley value (1953) to the case of simple games. Another concept for measuring voting power was introduced by Banzhaf (1965) , a lawyer, whose work has appeared mainly in law journals, and whose index has been used in arguments in various legal proceedings.
A cooperative game is a function v : 2 N ! R; with v(;) = 0: The players are the elements of N and the coalitions are the subsets S µ N of players. A simple game is a cooperative game v : 2 N ! f0; 1g ; such that v (N) = 1 and v is nondecreasing, i.e., v(S) µ v(T ) whenever S µ T µ N: A coalition is winning if v(S) = 1; and losing if v(S) = 0. The collection of all winning coalitions is denoted by W: We will use a shorthand notation and write S [ i for the set S [ fig. The Shapley value for the player i 2 N is de…ned by
where n = jNj, s = jSj. This value is an average of marginal contributions v(S [ i) ¡ v(S) of the player i to all coalitions S µ N n i. In this value, the sets S of di¤erent size get di¤erent weight. For simple games, Shapley and Shubik (1954) introduced the following power index, which is a specialization of the Shapley value.
Definition 1. The Shapley-Shubik index for the simple game (N; v) is the vector ©(v) = (© 1 (v); : : : ; © n (v)) ; given by
We now de…ne the normalized Banzhaf index. A swing for player i is a pair of coalitions (S [ i; S) such that S [ i is winning and S is not. For each i 2 N; we denote by´i(v) the number of swings for i in the game v; and the total number of swings iś
Definition 2. The normalized Banzhaf index is the vector
Coleman (1973) considered two indices to measure the power to prevent action and the power to initiate action. In the above notation, these two Coleman indices are°i
where ! and¸are the total number of winning and losing coalitions, respectively. For a comprehensive work on the problem of measuring voting power, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998) . We introduce a special class of simple games called weighted voting games. The symbol [q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ] will be used, where the quota q and the weights w 1 ; : : : ; w n are positive integers with 0 < q · P n i=1 w i : Here there are n players, w i is the number of votes of player i, and q is the quota needed for a coalition to win. Then, the above symbol represents the simple game v : 2 N ! f0; 1g de…ned for all S µ N by
where w(S) = P i2S w i : To be self-contained section 2 recalls the main results on generating functions to obtain Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. If the input size of the problem is n, then the function which measures the worst case running time for computing the indices is in O(2 n ) : Section 3 introduces the computational complexity and the algorithms based in the generating functions to obtain these power indices. In sections 4 and 5, we present several algorithms for computing the power indices with the system Mathematica. The paper concludes with some remarks on the complexity of generating functions methods for computing power indices in weighted voting games.
2. Generating functions. In order to obtain the power indices exactly, we present a combinatorial method based in the generating functions. The most useful method for counting the number of elements f(k) of a …nite set is to obtain its generating function. The ordinary generating function of f (k) is the formal power series
This power series is called formal because we ignore the evaluation on particular values and problems on convergence (see Stanley, 1986) . We can work with generating functions of several variables X
For each n 2 N; the number of subsets of k elements of the set N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is given by the explicit formula of the binomial coe¢cients
A generating function approach to binomial coe¢cients may be obtained as follows. Let S = fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n g be an n-element set. Regard the elements x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n as independent indeterminates. It is an immediate consequence of the process of multiplication (one could also give a proof by induction) that
Note that if T = ; then we obtain 1: If we put each x i = x; we obtain
We now present generating functions for computing the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices in weighted voting games, de…ned by [q; w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n ] :
David G. Cantor used generating functions for computing exactly the ShapleyShubik index for large voting games. As related by Mann and Shapley (1962) , Cantor's contribution was the following result (see Lucas, 1975, pp. 214-216) . The Shapley-Shubik index of the player i 2 N; satis…es
where A i (k; j) is the number of ways in which j players, other than i, can have a sum of weights equal to k.
Proposition 1.
(Cantor) Let [q; w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n ] be a weighted voting game. Then the generating function of the number A i (k; j) of coalitions S of j players with i = 2 S and w(S) = k; is given by
Proof. Let W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n g be the set of the weights of all the players. We consider the following generating function
where the coe¢cient A(k; j) is the number of coalitions of weight k and size j. To obtain the numbers A i (k; j); we drop the factor (1 + z x w i ) : ¤
The above approach was applied by Brams and A¤uso (1976) for computing the normalized Banzhaf index. The number of swings for the player i satis…eś
where b i (k) is the number of coalitions that do not include i with weight k.
Proposition 2. (Brams-A¤uso) Let [q; w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n ] be a weighted voting game. Then the generating function of the number b i (k) of coalitions S such that i = 2 S; and
Proof. For the weights W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n g ; we consider the generating function
where b(k) is the number of coalitions with weight k. To obtain the numbers b i (k); we delete the factor (1 + x w i ) : ¤ On the collection of simple games, we de…ne the operation meet^by 
Proof. For the weights W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n g and P = fp 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n g ; we consider the generating function
where b(k; r) is the number of coalitions S µ N such that w(S) = k; and p(S) = r. To obtain the numbers b i (k; r); we delete the factor (1 + x w i y p i ) : ¤ Proposition 4. Let v 1 = [q; w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n ] ; v 2 = [p; p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p n ] be weighted voting games. Then the generating function of the number A i (k; r; j) of coalitions S of j players such that i = 2 S; w(S) = k; and p(S) = r; is given by ShG i (x; y; z) = Q j6 =i (1 + z x w j y p j ) :
3. Computational Complexity. The classical procedures for computing the power indices are based in the enumeration of all coalitions. Thus, if the input size of the problem is n, then the function which measures the worst case running time for computing the indices is in O(2 n ) : In this section, we will give the algorithms based in the generating functions to obtain these power indices and we study its computational complexity. Throughout the remainder of this section, we will assume the logarithmic cost model. In this model, if we perform only a polynomial number of operations on numbers with at most a polynomial number of digits, then the algorithm will be polynomial (see Gács and Lovász, 1999) .
Let f (n) be a function from Z + to Z + . Recall that we denote O(f(n)) for the set of all functions g such that f (n) · cg (n) for all n¸n 0 : With this de…nition a polynomial
and this means that only the asymptotic behavior of the function as n ! 1 is being considered. The programs of our language contain only assignments and a for-loop construct. We use the symbol Ã for assignments, for example, g(x) Ã 1 denotes setting the value of g(x) to 1: A for-loop to calculate P i2I a i ; can be de…ned by
We denote by DTIME(f(n)) the class of languages whose time complexity is at most f (n): We say that a language has space complexity at most f(n); if it can be decided by a Turing machine with space demand (cells and tapes) at most f(n): This class is denoted by DSPACE(f(n)). The storage demand of a k-tape Turing machine is at most k times its time demand (in one step, at most k cells will be written). Therefore, DTIME(f(n)) ½ DSPACE(f(n)). Proof. Let i be a player, the function BG i (x) = Q j6 =i (1 + x w j ) is given by BG(x) Ã 1 for j 2 f1; : : : ; ng with j 6 = i do BG(x) Ã BG(x) + BG(x) x w j endfor The time to compute the line in the loop is in O(C) for every player. Thus the time to compute this function is O(nC) : We take BG i (x) = P k¸0 b i (k) x k ; for every player i 2 N, and consider the for loop w Ã w i s Ã 0 for k 2 fq ¡ w; : : : ; q ¡ 1g do
The time spent in the above loop is O(C) ; since in the sum we only consider the nonzero coe¢cients and the total time in the procedure is O(nC) : If this procedure is executed n times, we obtain the indices of the n players. ¤ Corollary 6. Let v 1 = [q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ] ; v 2 = [p; p 1 ; : : : ; p n ] be weighted voting games. If C is the number of nonzero coe¢cients of BG (x; y) ; then the time complexity of the generating algorithm for the Banzhaf indices of the meet game is O ¡ n 2 C ¢ .
Remark 1.
If the weighted n-voting game satis…es w i = w; for every player i 2 N then the number C of nonzero coe¢cients of BG(x) is n + 1: For weighted n-voting games such that all the sums of the weights are di¤erent, the number C = 2 n :
Theorem 7. Let [q; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ] be a weighted voting game. If C is the number of nonzero coe¢cients of ShG(x; z); then the time complexity of the generating algorithm for the Shapley-Shubik indices is O ¡ n 2 C ¢ .
Proof. The time to compute the function ShG i (x; z) = Q j6 =i (1 + z x w j ) ; with a for loop is O(nC) ; for every player. Also, there are two independents for loops:
w Ã w i gg(z) Ã 0 for k 2 fq ¡ w; : : : ; q ¡ 1g do gg(z) Ã gg(z) + A i (k; j) z j endfor Thus we obtain the polynomial gg(z) = P n¡1 j=0 b j z j ; whose coe¢cients appears in the next sum,
The factorial function takes O(n); and n · C: Thus we can calculate the index for player i in time O(nC) : For the n players, this procedure is executed n times. ¤ Remark 2. Since DTIME(f(n)) ½ DSPACE(f(n)), the generating algorithms described above have polynomial space complexity.
Algorithms with Mathematica.
We present several algorithms for computing the power indices with the system Mathematica. The procedure is similar to present by Tannenbaum (1997) , but in our algorithms we delete Expand in the de…ni-tion of the generating function and we use Apply[Plus, ]. Furthermore, we compute the voting power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union with the generating functions algorithms.
The game of the power of the countries in the EU Council is de…ned by N = fGE, UK, FR, IT, SP, NE, GR, BE, PO, SW, AU, DE, FI, IR, LUg ; v = [q; 10; 10; 10; 10; 8; 5; 5; 5; 5; 4; 4; 3; 3; 3; 2] ; where q = 62 or q = 65: Of course the classical procedures runs in time exponential 2 n ; where n is the number of players. In general, we cannot hope for a polynomial time complexity for the generating functions algorithms, but in many problems we obtain polynomial time whenever the number of coe¢cients and the maximum of the weights are polynomial in n.
The notebook of Mathematica for computing the classical index power is the following.
In [1] := votesUE={10, 10, 10, 10, 8, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2};  In The function BanzhafG computes the generating function for computing the Banzhaf index of a weighted voting game, given by a list of integer weights.
In[3] :=

BanzhafG[weights_List]:=Times @@ (1+x^weights)
We can …nd the complexity bound C for the function BanzhafG in the EU-game, as follows:
The function BanzhafIndexPlus computes the normalized Banzhaf index of player i by summing the appropriate coe¢cients in this generating function. Dividing the index of each player by the sum of all the indices gives the BanzhafPowerPlus distribution.
In [5] .11, 0.11, 0.11, 0.11, 0.0927, 0.0602, 0.0602, 0.0602, 0.0602, 0.0455, 0.0455, 0.0369, 0.0369, 0.0369, 0 .0248}
The number of coalitions of weight k and size j is the coe¢cient of x k z j in the generating function ShG for the Shapley-Shubik index. The function ShPowerPlus computes the Shapley-Shubik power distribution with the implementation in Mathematica of Tannenbaum and the modi…cations mentioned above.
In[11]:=
ShG[weights_List]:=Times @@ (1+z x^weights)
The complexity bound C for the function ShG in the EU-game is
In [12] [g,x] ; gg=Apply [Plus, coefi[[ Range[Max[1, Table 1 The next table shows the time in seconds for the new functions and the classical algorithms BanzhafIndex and ShapleyValue3, based in the potential of Hart and MasColell (1988) which is implemented by Carter (1993 Table 2 5. Power in 2-weighted voting games. To study the meet of the weighted voting games given by the votes in the EU Council and the population of the EU countries, we introduce the index PUE and the integer weights (obtained by roundo¤) according to this population. The notebook of Mathematica to calculate power indices in 2-weighted voting games is the following. votesUE={10, 10, 10, 10, 8, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2};  In [2] := population={80.61,57.96,57.53,56.93,39.11,15.24,10.35, 10.07,9.86,8.69,7.91,5.18,5.06,3.56,0 10; 10; 10; 10; 8; 5; 5; 5; 5; 4; 4; 3; 3; 3; 2] ; v 2 = [p; 22; 16; 16; 15; 11; 4; 3; 3; 3; 2; 2; 1; 1; 1; 0] ; where p 2 f51; 75g : Next, we de…ne the generating function BanzhafTwoG for the meet of two weighted voting games. To obtain the normalized Banzhaf index of player i, we de…ne the function BanzhafTwoIndex and BanzhafTwoPower computes the vector of these indices for all players. In [6] The complexity bound C for the function BanzhafTwoG in the above two weighted voting game is given by In [7] Table 3 6. Concluding remarks. In the present paper we have considered weighted and 2-weighted voting games. We have shown that there exist polynomial time algorithms based in generating functions to compute the classical power indices. We have also obtained that the complexity bound for these algorithms is the number C of nonzero coe¢cients of the generating function.
